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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-12-104(15) (1993), 59-12-104(24) 
(1993)1, Utah Admin. R. 865-19-85S and Utah Admin. R. 865-19-48S. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION MISCHARACTERIZED UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-12-
104(15) AS A STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Page 2 of the Utah State Tax Commission's Brief (the Utah 
State Tax Commission will be referred to as the "Commission" and 
Mount Olympus Waters, Inc. will be referred to as "Mt. Olympus") 
the last sentence of the section entitled "Standard of Review" 
reads that Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) "specifically directs the 
Tax Commission to define terms used within that section by rule." 
Brief of Respondent — Appellee, at 2. We simply note in passing 
that Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(15) as cited by the Commission has 
nothing to do with the "Standard of Review," and therefore, should 
not have been noted as a possible "Standard of Review." 
xThe language in the statute at issue was added in 1987. In 
1994, the Legislature amended the statute to eliminate the language 
at issue. See 1991 H.B. 279, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "1". The new legislation contains no provision for 
retroactive application and according to the Utah Constitution, the 
new legislation is effective sixty days after the Legislature 
adjourns. Utah Const. Art. VI § 25. Since the audit period at 
issue herein is January 1, 1988 through December 31, 1990, the new 
legislation does not apply to this appeal. 
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POINT II 
UTAH ADMIN. R. 865-19-48S IS INVALID BECAUSE IT CONFLICTS 
WITH UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-12-104(24). 
1. Utah Code Ann. S 59-12-104(24) is plain and 
unambiguous and the Court should not look beyond it to divine 
legislative intent• 
In two recent cases, this Court considered the necessity 
of examining legislative intent with respect to the Commission's 
interpretation of two sales tax exemptions. In Miller Welding 
Supply, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 361 (Utah App. 
1993), Miller Welding developed an alternative method to deliver 
oxygen to medically dependent individuals. The method involved the 
use of a machine (concentrator) that concentrated oxygen from the 
surrounding air and delivered it to the patient. Miller Welding 
sold the oxygen concentrators to patients without collecting sales 
tax based on its interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(10). 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(10) contains a sales tax exemption for 
"sales of medicine" and Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(4)(a)(i) defines 
medicine to include "any oxygen or stoma supplies prescribed by a 
physician." The Commission audited Miller Welding and disagreed 
with its interpretation and assessed sales tax on the sales of the 
concentrators. Miller Welding filed a petition for redetermination 
with the Commission and the Commission ruled that the exemption 
6 
does not apply. Even though the Court split on other issues, this 
Court agreed that: 
When statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous, we will not look beyond the 
language to determine legislative intent, 
(emphasis added). 
Miller Welding, at 362. 
The Court also agreed that: 
A statute is ambiguous if it can be understood 
by reasonably well-informed persons to have 
different meanings. 
Miller Welding, at 362. 
In OSI Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 860 
P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1993), this Court again considered the 
Commission's interpretation of a sales tax exemption. OSI operated 
a meat processing plant that produces ground meat patties for sale 
to McDonald's restaurants. In order to preserve the required 
quality, OSI sprayed liquid nitrogen on the patties. OSI purchased 
the liquid nitrogen from various vendors without paying sales tax 
based on its interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20). 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(20) contained a sales tax exemption for 
"sprays ... used to control ... diseases ... for commercial 
products or ... animal products." The Commission audited OSI and 
disagreed with OSI's interpretation and assessed sales tax on the 
purchases of liquid nitrogen. OSI filed a petition for 
redetermination with the Commission and the Commission ruled that 
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the liquid nitrogen purchased by OSI was not a "spray" and was not 
used to control "diseases" as contemplated by the statute. This 
Court reasserted its holding in Miller Welding and said: 
When statutory language is plain and 
unambiguous, we do not look beyond the same to 
divine legislative intent. (citations 
omitted) 
. . . 
Specifically, we will not interpret 
unambiguous language in a statute to 
contradict its plain meaning. (citations 
omitted) 
OSI Industries, at 383 and 384. 
One of the issues in this appeal is the meaning of the 
word "any" as used in the phrase "any container" that is found in 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(24). The word "any" standing alone is 
a plain and unambiguous word. A reasonably well informed person 
would not consider the word "any" to have different meanings. 
Furthermore, adding the word "any" to the statute (where previously 
the word was not part of the statute) , makes the phrase "any 
container" even clearer. When considering these two factors, a 
reasonably well-informed person would not consider the phrase "any 
container" to have different meanings. Therefore, this Court 
should not look beyond the statute to divine legislative intent and 
should hold that Utah Admin. R. 865-19-48S is invalid because it 
conflicts with Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(24). 
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2. Even if the Court examines legislative intent, the 
legislative intent is not clear. 
Even if the Court examines legislative history to 
determine legislative intent, the legislative intent is not clear. 
The Commission relies on Dr. Brady for the proposition that the 
Legislature did not intend to change previous tax policies. Dr. 
Brady said that "it is my understanding that the tax law will be 
still read and interpreted the same after these tax bills are 
passed as they are now." Recording at Senate Proceeding, January 
15, 1987. However, Dr. Brady did not understand the prior 
interpretation of the statute, as evidenced by his Committee's 
recommendation to add the word "any" to "container" in the 
legislative enactment. Adding the word "any" contradicts the 
reusable and non-reusable distinction of the Commission's rules. 
Obviously, Dr. Brady did not have a complete understanding of the 
reusable and non-reusable distinction, nor the prior interpretation 
of the statute. Dr. Brady was confused and he confused the 
legislature. Therefore, the legislative intent is not clear enough 
to support the Commission's position, and this Court should hold 
that Utah Admin. R. 865-19-48S is invalid. 
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3. Interpreting "any" using its plain meaning would not 
render the statute unreasonably confused or inoperable. 
The Commission argues that a plain reading of the statute 
would render the statute unreasonably confused and inoperable. The 
Commission then invites the Court to imagine a visit to a retail 
store where the value of the contents of containers are taxed but 
not the container. To the contrary, Mt. Olympus suggests that this 
Court imagine the results if it sustains the Commission's ruling. 
Lawyers, judges, and businessmen would be required to divine 
legislative intent contrary to the plain, unambiguous language of 
the statute. Words would not mean what they say. The tax system 
(and the entire legal system) would become inoperable because it 
would be necessary to examine legislative intent even for the 
clearest of statutes. Interpreting "any," using its plain meaning, 
would not render the statute unreasonably confused or inoperable, 
but just the opposite. Therefore, this Court should hold that Utah 
Admin. R. 865-19-48S is invalid. 
POINT III 
THE COMMISSION MISINTERPRETED B.C. OLSEN CO. V. STATE TAX 
COMMISSION. 
The Commission misinterpreted the Utah Supreme Court's 
analysis in E.C. Olsen v. State Tax Commission, 168 P.2d 324 (Utah 
1946). The Commission cited and quoted E.C. Olsen for the 
proposition that the sales tax exemption for containers does not 
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apply to reusable containers.2 The Commission, however, failed to 
recognize that the statute at issue in E.C. Olsen contained two 
exemptions. The first exemption was for personal property that 
"became an ingredient or component part of the finished products." 
Id. at 330. The second exemption was for the "container, labels or 
shipping cases of what was being manufactured." Jd. at 330. The 
provision quoted by the Commission applies to the first exemption, 
not the second exemption. The Court specifically held that the car 
strips, picking boxes, pea canning trays and milk cases or boxes 
are not "containers or labels or shipping cases within the means of 
subdivision (f).H Id. at 330. The Court ruled on the "ingredient 
or component part" portion of the statute (not the container 
portion). However, the Commission quotes E.C. Olsen to support its 
argument regarding containers, and then concludes that the 
container exemption applies "only to containers which were sold to 
and consumed by the consumer." Brief of Respondent — Appellee, at 
12. Within the same paragraph of the language quoted by the 
Commission, the Court goes on to say: 
2The sales tax applicable in E.C. Olsen contained an exemption 
for personal property "which enter[s] into and becomes an 
ingredient or component part of the tangible personal property or 
product which he manufactures, or compounds, or the container, 
label or shipping case thereof." Emergency Revenue Act of 1933 
[Sales Tax], L. 1933, Ch. 63, effective March 21, 1933, § 80-15-
2(f). 
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The test is: Are the articles involved 
consumed by the processor as the last user? 
If they are so consumed, the tax must be paid 
thereon by the processor. On the other hand, 
if the articles enter into and become an 
ingredient or component part of what he 
manufactures, and are thus passed on to the 
final user or the articles are containers, 
labels, or shipping cases of what he 
manufactures, the processor does not pay the 
tax. (emphasis added). 
Id. at 330. 
The analysis in E.C. Olsen concerning whether a 
particular item of personal property was used "over and over again" 
is used to determine if the personal property became an ingredient 
or component part of the finished product. According to the 
Supreme Court, if the personal property was to be used "over and 
over again", it did not become an ingredient or component part of 
the finished product and, therefore, not entitled to the first part 
of the exemption. The Court's conclusion would apply to a shovel, 
plow, ski lift or any other item of personal property. The 
Commission is confused because the E.C. Olsen picking boxes, pea 
canning trays and milk cases or boxes were considered "containers" 
in the generic sense, but were not containers of what was being 
manufactured and, therefore, not entitled to the second part of the 
exemption. Accordingly, in the case at bar, unlike E.C. Olsen, the 
Mt. Olympus containers are the containers for what is manufactured. 
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Holding that Mt. Olympus is entitled to the container exemption is 
consistent with the holding of E.C. Olsen v. State Tax Commission. 
POINT IV 
RULING THAT PASTEURIZATION REQUIRES HEAT PLACES AN 
UNWARRANTED AND UNNECESSARY RESTRICTIVE DEFINITION ON THE 
MANUFACTURING EXEMPTION. 
The Commission quoted Webster's Dictionary for the 
proposition that "pasteurization" requires heat. However, the 
Commission failed to read the alternative definition of 
pasteurization from the same source. Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary (1981) also defines pasteurization as the: 
2: partial sterilization of perishable food 
products (as frost or fish) with radiation (as 
gamma rays). 
Webster recognizes a hi-tech pasteurization process which does not 
require heat. The Commission failed to recognize the existence of 
such process. Ruling that pasteurization always requires heat 
makes unwarranted use of an unnecessary restrictive definition in 
a hi-tech world. Such an interpretation and zealous tax collection 
runs counter to the purpose of the underlying statute and leaves 
Utah years behind for the purpose of encouraging new applications 
of recognized manufacturing processes. Drawings (Exhibits A, B and 
C at the Commission hearing) that illustrate the hi-tech 
pasteurization process used by Mt. Olympus are attached hereto as 
Exhibit "2", "3" and "4". 
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POINT V 
STATUTES SHOULD BE INTERPRETED WITH ENOUGH LATITUDE TO 
ACCOMPLISH THE INTENDED PURPOSE. 
The Commission correctly states the general rule that 
exemptions are generally construed narrowly and then saysf among 
other things, that the manufacturing exemption should be construed 
narrowly. However, the Commission failed to quote the entire rule 
which states that exemptions should be construed with enough 
latitude to accomplish the intended purpose. In OSI Industries, 
this Court stated: 
Lastly, we note that although exemptions from 
taxation are generally construed narrowly, 
they should, nonetheless, be construed with 
sufficient latitude to accomplish the intended 
purpose. (citations omitted). 
OSI Industries, at 385. 
Following that directive, in the present case the 
manufacturing exemption should be construed with enough latitude to 
include the purchases presently at issue because the very exemption 
was intended to encourage such tax exempt purchases. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mt. Olympus is entitled to the 
statutory sales tax exemptions provided in Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-12-
104(24) and 59-12-104(15). Accordingly, the Commission's decision 
to the contrary should be reversed and all taxes paid by Mt. 
14 
Olympus in order to perfect this appeal should be refunded to Mt, 
Olympus with interest. 
Respectfully submitted this £ day of April 1994. 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
A Professional Corporation 
By: 
Kent A Zinebaugh 
Johr*/N • Brems 
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EXHIBIT 1 
SALES TAX - CONTAINER EXEMPTION 
1994 
GENERAL SESSION 
Enrolled Copy 
H. B. No. 279 By John L. Valentine 
AN ACT RELATING TO REVENUE AND TAXATION; CLARIFYING THE SALES TAX 
EXEMPTION FOR CONTAINERS, LABELS, AND SHIPPING CASES. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
59-12-104, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS 166 AND 296, LAWS OF UTAH 1993 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 59-12-104, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last 
amended by Chapters 166 and 296, Laws of Utah 1993, is amended to read: 
59-12-104. Exemptions. 
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes imposed by 
this chapter: 
(1) sales of aviation fuel, motor fuel, and special fuel subject to 
a Utah state excise tax under Title 59, Chapter 13, Motor and Special 
Fuel Tax Act; 
(2) sales to the state, its institutions, and its political 
subdivisions; 
(3) sales of food, beverage, and dairy products from vending 
machines in which the proceeds of each sale do not exceed $1 if the 
vendor or operator of the vending machine reports an amount equal to 120% 
of the cost of items as goods consumed; 
H. B. No, 279 
(4) sales of food, beverage, dairy products, similar confections, 
and related services to commercial airline carriers for in-flight 
consumption; 
(5) sales of parts and equipment installed in aircraft operated by 
common carriers in interstate or foreign commerce; 
(6) sales of commercials, motion picture films, prerecorded audio 
program tapes or records, and prerecorded video tapes by a producer, 
distributor, or studio to a motion picture exhibitor, distributor, or 
commercial television or radio broadcaster; 
(7) sales made through coin-operated laundry machines, coin-operated 
dry cleaning machines, or coin-operated car washes; 
(8) sales made to or by religious or charitable institutions in the 
conduct of their regular religious or charitable functions and activities 
and, after July 1, 1993, if the requirements of Section 59-12-104.1 are 
fulfilled; 
(9) sales of vehicles of a type required to be registered under the 
motor vehicle laws of this state which are made to bona fide nonresidents 
of this state and are not afterwards registered or used in this state 
except as necessary to transport them to the borders of this state; 
(10) sales of medicine; 
(11) sales or use of property, materials, or services used in the 
construction of or incorporated in pollution control facilities allowed 
by Sections 19-2-123 through 19-2-127; 
-2-
H. B. No. 279 
(12) sales or use of property which the state is prohibited from 
taxing under the Constitution or laws of the United States or under the 
laws of this state; 
(13) sales of meals served by: 
(a) public elementary and secondary schools; 
(b) churches, charitable institutions, and institutions of higher 
education, if the meals are not available to the general public; and 
(c) inpatient meals provided at medical or nursing facilities; 
(14) isolated or occasional sales by persons not regularly engaged 
in business, except the sale of vehicles or vessels required to be titled 
or registered under the laws of this state; 
(15) sales or leases of machinery and equipment purchased or leased 
by a manufacturer for use in new or expanding operations (excluding 
normal operating replacements, which includes replacement machinery and 
equipment even though they may increase plant production or capacity, as 
determined by the commission) in any manufacturing facility in Utah. 
Manufacturing facility means an establishment described in SIC Codes 2000 
to 3999 of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual, of the 
federal Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and 
Budget. For purposes of this subsection, the commission shall by rule 
define "new or expanding operations11 and "establishment .ff By October 1, 
1991, and every five years thereafter, the commission shall review this 
exemption and make recommendations to the Revenue and Taxation Interim 
Committee concerning whether the exemption should be continued, modified, 
-3-
H. B. No. 279 
or repealed. In its report to the Revenue and Taxation Interim 
Committee, the tax commission review shall include at least: 
(a) the cost of the exemption; 
(b) the purpose and effectiveness of the exemption; and 
(c) the benefits of the exemption to the state; 
(16) sales of tooling, special tooling, support equipment, and 
special test equipment used or consumed exclusively in the performance of 
any aerospace or electronics industry contract with the United States 
government or any subcontract under that contract, but only if, under the 
terms of that contract or subcontract, title to the tooling and equipment 
is vested in the United States government as evidenced by a government 
identification tag placed on the tooling and equipment or by listing on a 
government-approved property record if a tag is impractical; 
(17) intrastate movements of freight and express or street railway 
fares; 
(18) sales of newspapers or newspaper subscriptions; 
(19) tangible personal property, other than money, traded in as full 
or part payment of the purchase price, except that for purposes of 
calculating sales or use tax upon vehicles not sold by a vehicle dealer, 
trade-ins are limited to other vehicles only, and the tax is based upon 
the then existing fair market value of the vehicle being sold and the 
vehicle being traded in, as determined by the commission; 
(20) sprays and insecticides used to control insects, diseases, and 
weeds for commercial production of fruits, vegetables, feeds, seeds, and 
animal products; 
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H. B. No. 279 
(21) sales of tangible personal property used or consumed primarily 
and directly in farming operations, including sales of irrigation 
equipment and supplies used for agricultural production purposes, whether 
or not they become part of real estate and whether or not installed by 
farmer, contractor, or subcontractor, but not sales of: 
(a) machinery, equipment, materials, and supplies used in a manner 
that is incidental to farming, such as hand tools with a unit purchase 
price not in excess of $100, and maintenance and janitorial equipment and 
supplies; 
(b) tangible personal property used in any activities other than 
farming, such as office equipment and supplies, equipment and supplies 
used in sales or distribution of farm products, in research, or in 
transportation; or 
(c) any vehicle required to be registered by the laws of this state, 
without regard to the use to which the vehicle is put; 
(22) seasonal sales of crops, seedling plants, or garden, farm, or 
other agricultural produce if sold by the producer; 
(23) purchases of food made with food stamps; 
(24) [any—container7—tabefc7-sh±ppTng-case7-or7-±n-the-ease-o£-meat 
or—meat—prodnetS7—any—eas ing] sales of nonreturnable containers, 
nonreturnable labels, nonreturnable bags, nonreturnable shipping cases, 
and nonreturnable casings to a manufacturer, processor, wholesaler, or 
retailer for use in packaging tangible personal property to be sold by 
that manufacturer, processor, wholesaler, or retailer; 
(25) property stored in the state for resale; 
-5-
H. B. No. 279 
(26) property brought into the state by a nonresident for his or her 
own personal use or enjoyment while within the state, except property 
purchased for use in Utah by a nonresident living and working in Utah at 
the time of purchase; 
(27) property purchased for resale in this state, in the regular 
course of business, either in its original form or as an ingredient or 
component part of a manufactured or compounded product; 
(28) property upon which a sales or use tax was paid to some other 
state, or one of its subdivisions, except that the state shall be paid 
any difference between the tax paid and the tax imposed by this part and 
Part 2, and no adjustment is allowed if the tax paid was greater than the 
tax imposed by this part and Part 2; 
(29) any sale of a service described in Subsections 59-12-103 
(1Kb), (c), and (d) to a person for use in compounding a service taxable 
under the subsections; 
(30) purchases of food made under the WIC program of the United 
States Department of Agriculture; 
(31) sales or leases made after July 1, 1987, and before June 30, 
1996, of rolls, rollers, refractory brick, electric motors, and other 
replacement parts used in the furnaces, mills, and ovens of a steel mill 
described in SIC Code 3312 of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification 
Manual, of the federal Executive Office of the President, Office of 
Management and Budget, but only if the steel mill was a nonproducing Utah 
facility purchased and reopened for the production of steel; 
-6-
H. B. No. 279 
(32) sales of boats of a type required to be registered under Title 
73, Chapter 18, State Boating Act, boat trailers, and outboard motors 
which are made to bona fide nonresidents of this state and are not 
thereafter registered or used in this state except as necessary to 
transport them to the borders of this state; 
(33) sales of tangible personal property to persons within this 
state that is subsequently shipped outside the state and incorporated 
pursuant to contract into and becomes a part of real property located 
outside of this state, except to the extent that the other state or 
political entity imposes a sales, use, gross receipts, or other similar 
transaction excise tax on it against which the other state or political 
entity allows a credit for taxes imposed by this chapter; 
(34) sales of aircraft manufactured in Utah if sold for delivery and 
use outside Utah where a sales or use tax is not imposed, even if the 
title is passed in Utah; and 
(35) until July 1, 1999, amounts paid for purchase of telephone 
service for purposes of providing telephone service. 
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